Current News & Cases

Case Summaries

Banking Law

[02/01] GECCMC 2005-C1 Plummer Street Office L.P. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
In a suit alleging breach of lease agreements that the defendant bank assumed after it purchased a failed bank's assets and liabilities from the FDIC pursuant to the terms of a written purchase and assumption agreement, the district court's grant of the bank's motion to dismiss is affirmed, where under federal common law, the plaintiff lacked standing to bring suit under the agreement because it was not an intended third-party beneficiary of the agreement.

[01/24] TIFD III-E, Inc. v. US
In a suit by a taxpayer partner challenging IRS notices of adjustment reallocating a large percentage of the partnership's income for the years 1993 to 1998 to the taxpayer away from two Dutch banks that had purchased an interest in the partnership, and imposing a penalty for underpayment, the district court's judgment in favor of the taxpayer is reversed, where: 1) the banks' interest was not a capital interest for purposes of qualifying them as partners within the meaning of IRC section 704(e)(1); and 2) the taxpayer failed to point to substantial authority supporting its position, so that the government was entitled to impose a penalty on the taxpayer for substantial understatement of income.

[01/20] CRM Collateral II, Inc. v. TriCounty Metropolitan Transportation Dist. of Oregon
In proceedings following default on a standby letter of credit, the district court's disposition of the case on cross-motions for summary judgment is reversed and the case remanded, where: 1) the district court incorrectly concluded that the applicant for the letter of credit was a surety and erroneously permitted it to assert the defense of discharge; and 2) the applicant was not entitled to an award of damages because the beneficiary's draw on the letter of credit did not violate the statutory warranty to the applicant that the drawing did not violate any agreement between the applicant and the beneficiary.

[01/06] Vegas Diamond Properties, LLC v. FDIC
In an appeal from a judgment of the district court dissolving a Temporary Restraining Order on the ground that the anti-injunction provision of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act precluded it from enjoining the FDIC from conducting a trustee's sale of certain real properties, appeal is dismissed as moot where the subject properties were sold prior to appeal.

[12/29] Balderas v. Countrywide Bank, NA
In an appeal from a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the plaintiffs' Truth In Lending Act complaint, judgment is reversed where the complaint contained allegations that, if proven, presents a winning case, and thus the district court erred in dismissing the action however remote plaintiffs' ultimate success may be.

[12/23] Macpherson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
In a case in which an individual asserted state common law claims against a bank for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress stemming from the bank's alleged willful and malicious provision of false information about his finances to a consumer credit reporting agency, the district court's Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is affirmed, as the Fair Credit Reporting Act preempts the state law claims.

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Injury & Tort Law

[02/03] Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Roberts
In a suit brought by an insurer seeking a declaratory judgment that it was required to indemnify its insured for no more than 40 percent of a state court judgment because it had covered its insured for no more than 40 percent of the time in which the state court plaintiff was exposed to lead poisoning, the district court's judgment is: 1) affirmed in part, where it was correct in allocating the insurer's liability using the pro-rata time on-the-risk, and its decision to use the plaintiff's date of birth as the starting point for the period in which she was exposed to lead poisoning was sound; and 2) reversed in part, where the district court erred in holding the insurer liable for 24 months of coverage rather than 22, since under the insurance contract, coverage ended when the property was sold.

[02/02] Lore v. City of Syracuse
In a case alleging illegal retaliation against a city police officer under Title VII and the New York State Human Rights Law (HRL) because of her complaints of gender discrimination, the district court's judgment is: 1) affirmed in part where the city's arguments regarding the availability of reputation damages, evidentiary and instructional errors, and excessive damages for emotional distress presented no basis for disturbing the judgment; and 2) vacated in part where there was merit in plaintiff's contentions regarding the liability of the city's corporation counsel, and the district court erred in dismissing her principal gender discrimination claims under the HRL on the basis that she had suffered no materially adverse employment action.

[02/01] Maxton v. Western States Metals
In a suit alleging negligence and strict liability causes of action based on personal injuries as a result of working with metal products manufactured by the defendants and supplied to the plaintiff's employer, the district court's judgment in favor of the defendants on demurrers is affirmed, where: 1) the metal products involved were not inherently dangerous, and no other circumstances justified imposing liability on the defendants for the plaintiff's injuries under the component parts doctrine; 2) the plaintiff did not meet his burden of showing there was a reasonable possibility that the deficiencies in the complaint could be cured by amendment.

[01/30] Sennett v. US
In a suit by a photojournalist seeking money damages against the federal government for FBI agents' alleged violations of the Privacy Protection Act (PPA) stemming from a search of her apartment, the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the United States is affirmed, where: 1) the facts as alleged showed that the officers had probable cause to believe that the plaintiff was involved in criminal activity; and 2) the search of her home related to the investigation of that activity, so that the "suspect exception" to the PPA applied.

[01/27] AE v. County of Tulare
In a suit arising from the sexual assault of a minor by his foster brother, alleging against the county that ran the foster home a claim under 42 USC section 1983 for deliberate indifference and claims for negligence pursuant to California statutes, the district court's dismissal of all claims against the county is reversed, where: 1) the district court abused its discretion when it denied leave to amend the complaint to cure defects in the section 1983 claim; 2) the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the derivative liability claims against the county with prejudice and without leave to amend when it granted leave to amend as to the allegations regarding defendant county social workers.

[01/27] C9 Ventures v. SVC-West, L.P.
In a personal injury suit in which a lessor of helium-filled tanks used to inflate festive balloons cross-complained against the lessee to enforce an indemnification provision on the back of an unsigned invoice, the trial court's judgment in favor of the lessor and award of attorney fees to it is reversed, where: 1) the lessee did not manifest assent to the terms on the back of the unsigned invoice by course of dealing or course of performance, or under basic contract law; 2) the lessee did not sign the invoice or otherwise expressly agree to its terms; 3) an unsigned invoice itself is not a contract, and repeated delivery of a particular form does not make the form part of the parties' agreement; 4) payment of the invoice merely constituted the lessee's performance of the obligation under the oral contract to pay for the rental of the helium-filled tanks; and 5) assuming the transaction was a sale of goods covered by division 2 of the California Commercial Code, the indemnification provision was not an additional term of the contract under section 2207 of the Commercial Code.

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Insurance Law

[02/03] Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Roberts
In a suit brought by an insurer seeking a declaratory judgment that it was required to indemnify its insured for no more than 40 percent of a state court judgment because it had covered its insured for no more than 40 percent of the time in which the state court plaintiff was exposed to lead poisoning, the district court's judgment is: 1) affirmed in part, where it was correct in allocating the insurer's liability using the pro-rata time on-the-risk, and its decision to use the plaintiff's date of birth as the starting point for the period in which she was exposed to lead poisoning was sound; and 2) reversed in part, where the district court erred in holding the insurer liable for 24 months of coverage rather than 22, since under the insurance contract, coverage ended when the property was sold.

[02/03] Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. Ltd. v. Saint Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co.
The district court's grant of a petition to vacate an arbitral award is reversed, and on remand the district court is instructed to grant a cross-petition to confirm the award, where there was insufficient evidence before the district court on which to base a finding of "evident partiality" within the meaning of the Federal Arbitration Act despite the failure of two arbitrators to disclose their concurrent service as arbitrators in another, arguably similar, arbitration.

[01/30] M & F Fishing, Inc. v. Sea-Pac Insurance Managers, Inc.
In an action by owners and operators of commercial fishing companies alleging violations of the Unfair Competition Law predicated on violations of the Insurance Code, the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs is reversed and the matter is remanded, where: 1) the plaintiffs were not entitled to restitution for insurance lawfully placed from admitted carriers; 2) the plaintiffs were not entitled to restitution of premiums paid for nonadmitted coverage; 3) the plaintiffs were barred from recovering restitution of any broker fees based on a violation of Insurance Code section 1764.1 occurring more than four years before they filed suit; 4) the trial court should have granted one defendant's motion for nonsuit for lack of an agency relationship; 5) the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it denied the plaintiffs' motions to amend to add additional parties; and 6) the plaintiffs' entitlement to prejudgment interest was subject to the discretion of the trial court.

[01/27] Hutcherson v. Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System Administration
In a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that Arizona's Medicaid agency had no right at all to recover from an annuity purchased by a husband so that his institutionalized wife could obtain Medicaid coverage or, alternatively, had no right to recover for any costs incurred for the wife's care after the husband's death, the district court's grant of the defendant's motion for summary judgment is affirmed, where: 1) the federal Medicaid Act allows states to reach a deceased community spouse's annuity for costs incurred on behalf of an institutionalized spouse; and 2) nothing in the language of the Act was inconsistent with permitting the state agency to recover from the annuity expenses incurred after the husband's death.

[01/26] Lopez & Medina Corp. v. Marsh USA, Inc.
On appeal of a rejected cross-motion for summary judgment that argued that an insurance policy's coverage expressly applied to an airline's underlying claims for damages arising from the insured's failure to provide air transportation, as contractually required, to the airline's passengers, the district court's order denying the motion is affirmed, as the phrase "legally obligated to pay as damages" in a commercial general liability policy, which usually covers only tort claims, does not also provide coverage for claims in an underlying action arising out of and related to a contract between the parties.

[01/26] Fortin v. Titcomb
In a case in which a federal jury awarded the appellant $125,000 in damages against a police officer after finding that the officer negligently used force in arresting the appellant, which award the district court reduced to $10,000, the maximum set by the Maine Tort Claims Act (MTCA) for the personal liability of government employees, the following questions are certified to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court: 1) where an insurance policy is available to cover a judgment against a government employee sued in his or her personal capacity, is the limit on the award of damages $10,000 as set by the MTCA at section 8104-D or is the limit set by reference to sections 8105(1) and 8116?; and 2) which interpretive principles should be applied to construe an insurance policy, procured by a governmental body to cover itself or its employees for MTCA damages liability, that contains an ambiguity affecting the scope of coverage?

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Intellectual Property

[02/01] Thorner v. Sony Computer Entertainment America LLC
In a patent infringement action concerning a patent relating to a tactile feedback system for computer video games, the district court's judgment of noninfringement upon stipulation is vacated and the case remanded, where: 1) the district court improperly limited the term "attached to said pad" to mean attachment only to an external surface, and the parties based the stipulation of noninfringement on the district court's erroneous construction of this claim; and 2) the district court erred in its construction of the term "flexible."

[01/27] Krippelz v. Ford Motor Co.
In a patent infringement case involving a vehicle-mounted lamp, the district court's denial of the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law on invalidity is reversed, its summary judgment of infringement is vacated, and the case is remanded for entry of judgment of nonliability for the defendant, where the district court committed reversible error in its holdings that: 1) a reasonable jury could find that a competing French patent failed to teach the required "conical beam of light;" and 2) the jury could have reasonably found the French patent to lack a lamp "adjacent to the window."

[01/23] Falana v. Kent State University
In a suit against a university and inventors listed on a patent alleging that the plaintiff was an omitted co-inventor, the district court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiff as to inventorship is affirmed, where: 1) the district court did not err in construing the language of the claims; 2) error in the exclusion of certain exhibits did not result in substantial injustice and was harmless error; 3) the district court did not err in concluding that the plaintiff's contribution of the method used by the team of which he was a part for making the claimed compounds was enough of a contribution to conception to pass the threshold required for joint inventorship; and 4) the district court's exceptional case finding and award of attorney fees were not yet final and not properly before the court of appeals.

[01/20] Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber
In a patent infringement action involving patents directed to a computer-aided method and system for processing credit applications over electronic networks, the district court's rulings on summary judgment motions are affirmed in part, vacated in part, reversed in part, and the case remanded, where: 1) the district court erred in granting summary judgment of noninfringement based on a construction of "communications medium" that carved out the Internet; 2) the court modified the claim constructions of "communications medium" and "central processing means," requiring it to vacate summary judgment of noninfringement and remand to the district court to determine infringement in the first instance applying the new constructions; 3) the district court legally erred in denying a motion for summary judgment of invalidity of certain claims for indefiniteness; 4) the district court correctly found that certain claims were patent ineligible abstract ideas.

[01/19] Washington State Republican Party v. Washington State Grange
In a suit involving the State of Washington's "top-two" primary election system, the district court's order granting the state's request for reimbursement of attorney's fees is reversed, and its summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff's claims in other respects is affirmed, where: 1) the state showed that its primary system furthered an important regulatory interest in providing voters with relevant information about the candidates on the ballots, so as to defeat the plaintiffs' as-applied freedom of association claims; 2) the state's primary system did not violate its fundamental right of access to the ballot by making it difficult for a minor-party candidates to qualify for the general election ballot; 3) a plaintiff did not explain how the state infringed its trademark in connection with the provision of competing services; 4) a written settlement definitively resolved the state's liability for attorney's fees; 5) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend the complaint to add a new claim; 6) the plaintiffs waived a claim concerning compelled speech because it was not included in any complaint; and 7) the primary system was severable from an unconstitutional provision of the same enacting legislation.

[01/18] Golan v. Holder
In a suit by orchestra conductors, musicians, publishers, and others who formerly enjoyed free access to literary and artistic works removed from the public domain by section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, the Tenth Circuit's reversal of a grant of summary judgment to the plaintiffs is affirmed, as: 1) section 514 does not exceed Congress’s authority under the Copyright Clause; and 2) the First Amendment does not inhibit the restoration of foreign works to copyright protection by section 514.

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Legal Malpractice

[05/05] In Re: Teligent, Incorporated
In a dispute arising from an action for legal malpractice, judgment of the district court denying motion to lift bankruptcy protective orders and cross-motion for injunctive relief barring defendant from attacking the validity of a settlement agreement on the grounds of waiver is affirmed where: 1) defendant-law firm failed to make the requisite showing to lift orders; and 2) it was not a party in interest with standing such that its failure to contest the validity of settlement agreement constituted waiver.

[04/19] Callahan v. Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher
In a dispute alleging professional malpractice arising from the drafting of a deficient partnership agreement by the defendant, summary judgment on the ground that action was time-barred is reversed because placement of actual injury upon the execution of the defective agreement was erroneous where CCP section 340.6 (a)(1), tolled the limitations period until plaintiff could establish a cause of action for legal malpractice.

[04/13] Knopick v. Connelly
In a dispute arising from a legal malpractice claim and the timeliness of underlying tort action, summary judgment in favor of defendant on the ground that action was time-barred is reversed where district court failed to apply the discovery rule to underlying claim, and there was a genuine issue of fact prohibiting summary dismissal.

[03/04] Augusta v. Keehn and Associates
In a civil action alleging legal malpractice, order denying petition by plaintiff to compel arbitration of action is affirmed, as it is supported by substantial evidence.

[01/13] Cassel v. Superior Court
In plaintiff's malpractice action against his attorneys, claiming that by bad advice, deception, and coercion, the attorneys, who has a conflict of interest, induced him to settle for a lower amount than he had told them he would accept in the underlying action, the court of appeals' judgment vacating the trial court's grant of defendant attorneys motion to exclude all evidence of private attorney-client discussions immediately preceding, and during, the mediation concerning mediation settlement strategies and defendants' efforts to persuade plaintiff to reach a settlement in the mediation, is reversed where: 1) the result reached by the court of appeals contravenes the Legislature's explicit command that, unless the confidentiality of a particular communicative is expressly waived, under statutory procedures, by all mediation "participants," or at least by all those "participants" by or for whom it was prepared, things said or written for the purpose of and pursuant to a mediation shall be inadmissible in any civil action; 2) as the statutes make clear, confidentiality, unless waived, extends beyond utterances or writings in the course of a mediation, and thus is not confined to communications that occur between mediation disputants during the mediation proceeding itself, and by holding otherwise, and overturning the trial court's exclusionary order, the court of appeal erred.

[01/11] Warrior Sports, Inc. v. Dickinson Wright, P.L.L.C.
In a patent owner's malpractice action against a law firm, arising from an underlying patent infringement litigation involving patents directed to lacrosse sticks and heads, district court's dismissal of the suit for lack of jurisdiction is vacated and remanded as, because at least one of plaintiff's malpractice claims requires the court to resolve a substantive issue of patent law, 28 U.S.C. section 1338, which grants district courts exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising under a statute relating to patents, invests the district court with subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims in this case.

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Sports Law

[11/02] CBS Corporation v. Federal Communications Commission
In a petition for review of an order of defendant-FCC penalizing petitioner for broadcasting a fleeting nude image during the National Football League's Super Bowl halftime performance, petition is granted because defendant failed to acknowledge that its order reflected a policy change and improperly imposed a penalty on petitioner for violating a previously unannounced policy.

[04/28] Cedar Fair v. City of Santa Clara
In a petition for a writ of mandate pursuant to the California Environmental Quality Act (Act) and pertaining to the allocation, in a term sheet, of a proposed site for a 49er stadium, judgment of the trial court denying petition is affirmed because term sheet did not constitute a project or a project approval within the meaning of the Act and, therefore, preparation of an environmental impact report was not required.

[04/01] Lopera v. Town of Coventry
In a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 dispute arising from a police search of team members after a heated match and with the consent of team coach, summary judgment in favor of defendants is affirmed where officers were entitled to qualified immunity and plaintiffs did not introduce sufficient evidence supporting a finding that the police engaged in racial discrimination.

[03/08] Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Department of Education
In a lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. section 1681-88, summary judgment in favor of defendants is affirmed where plaintiff failed to offer any support for its numerous constitutional, statutory, and procedural claims.

[02/16] Rosencrans v. Dover Images, Inc.
In a tort action brought by a motorcyclist against operators of a motorcross track, alleging negligence, negligent training and supervision, and loss of consortium, summary judgment to defendant on all causes of action is reversed as to the gross negligence claim, but affirmed in all other respects.

[01/10] Eriksson v. Nunnink
In plaintiff-parents' suit for wrongful death and infliction of emotion distress against defendant, their deceased daughter's horse riding coach, claiming that defendant increased the risk of harm reasonably assumed by their daughter when defendant allowed their daughter to ride a horse that was unfit to ride because of prior falls and lack of practice and concealed this condition from the plaintiffs, trial court's grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment is reversed where: 1) as to primary assumption of risk, defendant failed to set forth facts in her separate statement of undisputed facts negating the plaintiffs' allegation that defendant increased the risk of injury to their daughter by allowing her to ride a horse that was unfit to ride because of prior falls and lack of practice; 2) defendant failed to meet her burden of production as it relates to the element of breach of duty; 3) with respect to express contractual assumption of risk, defendant failed to meet her burden of proof of production that she was not grossly negligent; 4) even if defendant met her initial burden, triable issues of fact exist as to duty, breach of duty, and gross negligence; and 5) with respect to causation, if defendant's undisputed statement of facts addressed the issue, the plaintiffs have demonstrated a triable issue of fact.

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Transportation

[01/31] Lane v. Valverde
In a case in which a driver tested above the legal limit for blood alcohol and had his driving privilege suspended by the DMV, the trial court's grant of a petition for a writ of mandate directing the DMV to reinstate the petitioner's driving privilege is reversed, where the blood alcohol testing instrument was not out of compliance with the regulation when the petitioner was tested, even though it may have been out of compliance with 17 Cal. Code Regs. section 1221.4(a)(2)(B) when it was next tested after use on the petitioner.

[01/26] Lopez & Medina Corp. v. Marsh USA, Inc.
On appeal of a rejected cross-motion for summary judgment that argued that an insurance policy's coverage expressly applied to an airline's underlying claims for damages arising from the insured's failure to provide air transportation, as contractually required, to the airline's passengers, the district court's order denying the motion is affirmed, as the phrase "legally obligated to pay as damages" in a commercial general liability policy, which usually covers only tort claims, does not also provide coverage for claims in an underlying action arising out of and related to a contract between the parties.

[01/25] Vitkievicz v. Valverde
In a challenge to the temporary revocation of a driver's license, the trial court's dismissal of a petition for writ of mandate after the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend is affirmed, where: 1) the petition was not timely filed; and 2) regardless of whether the demurrer was timely filed, the trial court in the interests of justice could rule on the merits of the statute of limitations defense, and any procedural defect with respect to such an untimely pleading does not affect the substantial rights of the parties and therefore is not grounds for reversal.

[01/24] Mabey Bridge & Shore, Inc. v. Schoch
In a suit by a corporation engaged in the business of supplying temporary steel bridges for construction projects, seeking a declaration that the Pennsylvania Steel Products Procurement Act, as interpreted and enforced by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT), is unconstitutional, and requesting a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining PennDOT from prohibiting the use of the company's temporary bridges on its projects, the district court's grant of summary judgment against the company on all its claims is affirmed, where: 1) the state Steel Act was not preempted by the federal Buy America Act and related federal regulations; 2) the Steel Act is not unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause; 3) PennDOT's actions did not violate the Contract Clause; and 4) PennDOT's application of the Steel Act did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.

[01/04] New York Civil Liberties Union v. New York City Transit Authority
In a suit under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 brought by organization that advocates for open governmental and judicial proceedings to enjoin a policy requiring third parties to obtain the consent of those contesting notices of violation before a city’s transit adjudication bureau in order to observe such hearings, on the basis that the policy violated the organization's First Amendment right of access to government proceedings, the district court's injunction halting enforcement of the policy is affirmed, where: 1) the organization had standing because it alleged a cognizable interest and both past and imminent injuries to it; 2) the administrative proceedings at issue were subject to a qualified public right of access under the First Amendment; and 3) the policy did not meet the standard for justifying closure.

[12/19] Ceja v. Dept. of Transportation
In an appeal from a judgment in favor of the defendant in an action for wrongful death, judgment is affirmed where the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded evidence of pre-1994 accident on a state highway because the physical conditions existing before 1994 were substantially different from those that existed at the time of decedents’ death in 2003.

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